Property owners will take notice of shifting winds. Recent data analysis shows that democratic edicts for adherence to extreme dogma actually alienate the base. Who’da thunk it? Turns out that support for mainstream values may close the slim margin of victory that carried 2020.

This was Peggy Noonan’s topic in the Wall Street Journal on Sunday, July 10, 2021 (“The Culture War Is a Leftist Offensive”). This paradigm shift may portend marked political change. Consider:

● Since 1994, Democrats have moved left far more than Republicans have moved right.

● This has produced lots of safe states in liberal places like California and Massachusetts but has steadily pulled Democrats farther and farther away from median states like Iowa and Ohio.

● Recently, white academic theories of racism—and probably the whole woke movement in general—have turned off many moderate Black and Hispanic voters. Ditto for liberal dismissal of crime and safety issues. Hispanics in particular moved in Trump’s direction despite—or maybe because of—his position on immigration and the wall.

● Democrats will remain on an electoral knife edge forever unless they can pull themselves back toward the center.
[Credit: Kevin Drum, “If you hate the culture wars, blame liberals.” July 3, 2021,

What does this mean to radical property confiscators? Political Backlash. Mr. Drum beats on:

“It is not conservatives who have turned American politics into a culture war battle. It is liberals. And this shouldn’t come as a surprise: Almost by definition, liberals are the ones pushing for change while conservatives are merely responding to whatever liberals do. . . What matters is what the median voter feels, and Democrats have been moving further and further away from the median voter for years…”

“Our election victory in 2020 was razor thin even though (a) the economy sucked, (b) we were in the middle of a pandemic, (c) voters had had four years to see just what Donald Trump was really like, and (d) our candidate was bland, amiable, white, male Joe Biden. This should scare the hell out of liberals. … [¶] The best explanation for how 2020 played out comes from David Shor, a data geek who identifies as socialist but is rigorously honest about what the numbers tell us.”

Says Shor: “. . .What happened in 2020 is that nonwhite conservatives voted for Republicans at higher rates; they started voting more like white conservatives….Clinton voters with conservative views on crime, policing, and public safety were far more likely to switch to Trump… [A] nd having conservative views on those issues was more predictive of switching from Clinton to Trump than having conservative views on any other issue-set was. … [¶] … This lines up pretty well with trends we saw during the campaign. In the summer, following the emergence of “defund the police” as a nationally salient issue, support for Biden among Hispanic voters declined. So I think you can tell this microstory: We raised the salience of an ideologically charged issue that millions of nonwhite voters disagreed with us on.… these conservative Hispanic voters who’d been voting for us despite their ideological inclinations started voting more like conservative whites..”

Shor, the avowed socialist defined as a “data geek,” points to over-radicalization pushing minorities to rational alternatives: “… we’ve ended up in a situation where white liberals are more left wing than Black and Hispanic Democrats on pretty much every issue: taxes, health care, policing, and even on racial issues or various measures of “racial resentment.” So as white liberals increasingly define the party’s image and messaging, that’s going to turn off nonwhite conservative Democrats and push them against us.”

He sums up: “….If Democrats elevate issues or theories that a large minority of nonwhite voters reject, it’s going to be hard to keep those margins….Black conservatives and Hispanic conservatives don’t actually buy into a lot of these intellectual theories of racism. They often have a very different conception of how to help the Black or Hispanic community than liberals do. And I don’t think we can buy our way out of this trade-off. Most voters are not liberals. If we polarize the electorate on ideology — or if nationally prominent Democrats raise the salience of issues that polarize the electorate on ideology — we’re going to lose a lot of votes.”

Peggy Noonan concludes: “I end with what I think is the left’s misreading of its position. They act as if they’ve got everyone on the run, including those who show their movement the greatest respect in corporate suites and private offices. But I think something unspoken is going on. As a journalist based in New York, you meet a lot of executives, corporate leaders, people in the arts and education. They publicly support the woke regime, speak the lingo, are on board with the basic assumptions, and much early support was sincere. But they have grown indignant at and impatient with the everyday harassments of woke ideology. Deep down, many of them would like to see the left knocked back on their feet. I think the left is overplaying its hand.” Peggy Noonan, “The Culture War Is a Leftist Offensive,”

Why do we care?

Organizations that cherish property rights may have the opportunity to drive for positive change if the median voter continues to reject super- radicalism in upcoming elections: reinforcement, restoration, and buttressing of property rights against future attacks, including the basic and human right to mutually agreeable long-term housing stability (i.e., exempted long-term leases now eviscerated for sake of government control and distrust of mutually agreeable power to enter contracts: see, AB 2782). Perhaps a time will come when we can protect constitutional rights to property, and nurture collaborative progress in the private sector, like fair bargaining and leasing—instead of subjection to forced government-control down our throats. Perhaps there is an American dream after all.